Hasina, who has lived in exile in New Delhi since her ouster in August 2024 following months of student protests, was sentenced to death by the International Criminal Tribunal (ICT) on Monday on charges of crimes against humanity.
While the ICT verdict remains relevant in terms of accountability and post-transitional justice in the neighboring country, New Delhi is unlikely to issue it, even as it reaffirms its commitment to the people of Bangladesh.
An exemption provision in the 2013 extradition treaty could provide a legal basis for the Indian government to allow Hasina to continue living in exile. Mint explains:
What is ICT and its verdict?
Hasina set up the ICT in 2009 to investigate crimes against humanity committed during the 1971 war that secured Bangladesh’s independence from Pakistan. The tribunal has been the subject of criticism from its political rivals and human rights organizations since its inception.
In the current case, Hasina, former Bangladesh Home Minister Asaduzzaman Khan Kamal and former Inspector General of Police Chowdhury Abdullah Al-Mamun were accused of crimes against humanity during the July 2024 uprising that left nearly 1,400 protesters dead.
A court in Dhaka handed down the death penalty in absentia to Hasina on charges of inciting violence, ordering murders and allowing the use of lethal force against protesters, mostly students.
What is the significance of the verdict in post-Hasina Bangladesh?
From the point of view of justice, the judgment has both symbolic and substantive value. Bangladesh’s interim leader Muhammad Yunus welcomed the verdict, saying it was a moment of justice that acknowledged the suffering of the student protesters.
It also creates a narrative of making powerful leaders accountable and highlights the independence and autonomy of the judiciary in post-Hasina Bangladesh.
However, the fairness of the trial remains questionable, especially since it was held in absentia and may not have been completely free of political influence. It is worth noting that Bangladesh is heading towards elections early next year and Hasina remains a polarizing figure.
While due process is under scrutiny, the existence of substantial evidence of mass atrocities during Hasina’s tenure cannot be denied. Ensuring accountability through fair and independent judicial processes remains essential.
How did Hasina respond?
Hasina called the verdict biased and politically motivated. She criticized the ICT, calling it a “rigged tribunal set up and presided over by an unelected government with no democratic mandate”. In her statements, she said that while the situation had spiraled out of control last July, what happened could not be characterized as “premeditated”.
She defended her stay in office and reiterated her strong record on human rights, as well as her government’s role in boosting the country’s economic growth and prosperity.
How did India respond?
In a statement on November 17, India said it had taken note of the verdict announced by the “International Crimes Tribunal in Bangladesh” against Hasina. “As a close neighbour, India remains committed to the best interests of the Bangladeshi people, including peace, democracy, inclusion and stability in the country. To this end, we will always engage constructively with all stakeholders,” it said.
The official response was measured, with New Delhi following a wait-and-see policy with respect to its nearest neighbour. However, he will have to be mindful of the fact that support for the regime may not predict its long-term interest in Dhaka. With public anger against Hasina still high, India needs to take a pragmatic approach, as she rightly pointed out, for the sake of the Bangladeshi people.
Does India have a ‘compulsory obligation’ to extradite Hasina?
The ICT conviction meets the minimum procedural requirement for extradition under the 2013 treaty. However, India is under no “compulsory obligation” to extradite Hasina and can invoke exceptions under the following provisions.
First, Articles 1 and 2 relate to the case of double criminality. This means that the alleged crime – in this case, crimes against humanity – must be recognized under the domestic laws of both countries. This gives India room to refuse extradition on the grounds that the offense charged does not fit the template of Indian domestic law.
Second, India can refuse extradition under Article 6(1) and Article 8(3). 6(1) expressly allows refusal where the alleged offense is of a “political character”. Article 8(3) reinforces this by stating that extradition may be refused if the application is not made in good faith or is not in the interests of justice.
India can invoke both provisions and claim that the allegations are politically motivated and not made in good faith. In such a scenario, the onus will be on the Yunus regime to prove that the allegations were made in good faith. Further, India’s own Extradition Act of 1962 provides supportive legal barriers against the extradition of accused persons in politically sensitive cases.
While anger and emotion have little room in diplomacy, a people-centric approach requires India to assess its position in terms of “good faith” on both sides.
Shweta Singh is Associate Professor in the Department of International Relations at South Asian University.
