It took two to tango set the stage on September 17, 1948 in Hyderabad

The two men – then Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Deputy Prime Minister Vallabhbhai Patel – who planned and executed the diplomatic euphemism of Police Action. | Photo credit: Undated pre-1950 archival image

A week before the tanks and armored personnel carriers rolled into Hyderabad, Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru made it clear on the floor of the Constituent Assembly: “India could never agree to Hyderabad having independent relations with any other power because it would jeopardize its own security. Historically, Hyderabad has never been independent. Practically, it cannot be independent under today’s circumstances.” The September 7, 1948 message was much stronger than previous messages.

A few weeks earlier, on 4 June 1948, Deputy Prime Minister Vallabhbhai Patel had written to Nehru in Dehradun. “I feel and feel very strongly that we should not do anything in Hyderabad, either with regard to its internal constitutional problems or with regard to its accession, which we cannot in good conscience justify to the world and to our people.”

This was the good-cop-bad-cop routine two Indian statesmen followed as the Kashmir war turned into a diplomatic and security quagmire. The two Indian leaders were worried about what it would look like to use strong-arm tactics to confront the rebellious Nizam Mir Osman Ali Khan and his band of advisers and warriors.

The Nizam’s government reportedly gave $48,000, i.e. ₹20 million a year, to the United Press of America to broadcast the Hyderabad version of the news to the world. The Nizam’s government also funded films that were shot in Hyderabad to show the peaceful life in the state.

In contrast, India resorted to diplomacy and letter writing. In the time before Operation Polo or Police Action, Patel was also in touch with British diplomats. One of them, Arthur Henderson, the United Kingdom’s foreign secretary, wrote on 26 June 1948: “I still hope that a satisfactory settlement can be reached, both with regard to Kashmir and Hyderabad. Whatever form of political arrangement there may be, both Pakistan and India have everything to gain by friendly co-operation, and by good neighborliness with India they will also be much closer to India.”

Diplomacy was thin. Patel was furious when that didn’t help. “Our attempt at a settlement, which has so often come close to success, has unfortunately ended in failure. There are forces at work which are determined not to allow any agreement to be reached between Hyderabad and the Union of India, and which are gradually gaining strength in Hyderabad, and seem now to be in complete control of the Government of the State.”

He was replying to an e-mail sent by Nehru on 27 May 1948 which said: “I feel that it would be of immense advantage to us if we could satisfactorily deal with Hyderabad and render it harmless by bringing it effectively under our control.”

The diplomatic pretense worked so well that the CIA spooks in their weekly intelligence briefing of 26 May 1948 did not expect Indian action in mid-September: “India is unlikely to take overt steps to end the independence of Hyderabad before the expiry of the India-Hyderabad ‘standstill agreement’ on 15 November.”

This wasn’t meant to be. Between the morning of 13 September and the afternoon of 17 September 1948, India was in effective control of Hyderabad State. A state that has existed continuously since 1724.

Even seasoned diplomats were surprised by the rapid turn of events, which were like a sea tide that had normally subsided. Sir Walter Monckton, who advised the Nizam in dealings with the Government of India, wrote to Patel. “I want to tell you how relieved I am that the action you were eventually forced to take did not lead to widespread social problems. I know how much you wanted to avoid such action and how hard you tried to avoid it. I honestly believe moderate world opinion shared your view rather than the latter.”

Published – 16 Sep 2026 21:01 IST