In the middle of the accusation of manipulation with election roles and guerrillas balanced against the Indian Election Commission (ECI) by Congress, investigating a systematic attempt to remove 5,994 votes in the election district in Aland in the Kalaburagag district in the Karnataka district. The case concerns the removal of voters by creating Form 7 before the elections of the Assembly in 2023 and cool, as the ECI must still share the key data needed to pick up the accused.
The case came to light in February 2023, when the leader of the congress and then the candidate for Aland BR was alerted to several applications for election deletion in his election district without knowing each other. He quickly filed a complaint on ECI. “One of the officers at the stand level (BLOS) received a request for form 7 to delete his brother’s vote when he did not even ask. Her brother was my supporter. The request was submitted on behalf of another voter in the same village who also did not know.”
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Many voters whose names were sought to delete, and those whose authorization were misused to submit applications for Form 7, soon filed complaints about Aland then. Hind is held by copies of 38 such applications. This has been verified 6,018 applications in the election district.
Mamata Devi, returning officer, Aland, and then assistant Commissioner Kalaburagagi, in his complaint to the Aland Police 21 February 2023, said 6,018 cases, only 24 applications were real and submitted because voters moved the electoral district. These voices have been removed. The remaining 5,994 voters remained in their addresses. Fir (26/2023 Aland PS) was registered against unknown persons for counterfeiting, personification and providing false documents. In the end, these 5,994 voters’ names were not deleted and could vote in the elections by 2023, but the investigation of the case remains open to this day.
Way of operation
Shrishaila Barabayi, 42 years, a two -wheel wheel mechanic in the village of Sarasamba, Aland Taluk, remembered how he was shocked when he found that there was a request to remove his name from the voter list and said he “moved”. Its name is given in number 71 part (serial number 775). “I have always lived in this village. I realized that when the Blo came, I realized there was such a request. I do not understand how anyone else can ask for deleting my vote,” he said.
Similar is the story of Kashima Ali, 48, farmers in the village of Sarasamba, also listed in number 71 (serial number 563). He said that after the Blood came, she asked at the request of deleting his vote in 2023, assumed that his vote was deleted and did not vote both in the elections by 2023 and 2024 Lok Sabha. Based on the BLO report, however, that it remained at the same address, a counterfeit application was rejected.
The application 7 application to remove both names was used on the name Suryakant Govin, 67. This headmaster of a retirement school now runs a pharmacy shop in the village of Sarasamba and is voter in the same part number 71 (Serial Number 1). “Nine applications have been made in my name that deleted voters from Part 71, where I also have a voter. I don’t know how miscreants did. In all these applications, while my further credentials, including epic and photos are correct, phone numbers vary in each application.
The Hindus spoke to several Aland voters whose voices tried to erase or forged applications submitted in their names. In several cases, applications for the removal of voters throughout the household were submitted. For example, Veeranna Honashetta, a retirement police officer, said there were requests to eliminate eight votes in his family, including the vote of his wife Revamma, a member of the congress that attacked Zilla Panchayat in surveys.
The observed pattern was that the applicant for the removal of votes was usually the first voter in this issue of the part and in rare cases, the second in the list.
Well scheduled traffic
The case was transferred to the Criminal Criminal Investigation Department (CID) in Karnataka, where it seems that the trail has cooled after a probe covering two and a half years.
The probe has so far disintegrated a comprehensive network of sophisticated operations. The applications for Form 7 were made via the National Voter Service Portal (NVS), App Line for voters (VHA) and Garuda ECI. Correspondence between CID and Chief Election Director (CEO), Karnataka, showed that CID applied for “IP protocols), date, time along with target IP and target ports” and sessions through which these counterfeit applications were submitted.
In seven letters written by CEOs from January to April 2025 and five written earlier, CID officials said they repeated the same request for target IP and target ports. “During the investigation, IP protocols are provided. During the investigation, the target IP and the target port are missing. Therefore, it is required for the affected to provide the same,” she gained four letters to which Hindu reading is accessible. However, there was no response to this particular question, sources said. Without target IP and target ports, the probe stopped.
Sources in CID reported in September 2023, ECI shared data of more than 5,700 counterfeit 7s forms. While there were enough data on more than 4,400 applications, the rest had incomplete data. The ECI also provided mobile numbers used to create login IDs and passwords on three ECI applications, through which all forged forms 7, except IP protocols, were submitted.
“We watched nine mobile numbers among the batches. They usually come from Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh. The owners of these numbers claim that they have never created these accounts in any of the ECI applications. Many of them are digitally illiterate,” the higher official said.
CID reportedly wrote to the telecommunications service providers (TSPS) and received a record of the Internet detail (IPDR), which had IP addresses of IPv4, and each IP address was connected to more than 200 users in the form of dynamic IP addresses. This would mean more than eight Lakh devices to verify and examine, sources said.
The IP address is a digital address for the machine on the Internet. This can be used to monitor the machine from which a specific transaction was made. However, IP is not always static. A dynamic IP is a temporary address assigned to a server machine.
To narrow the search, CID asked ECI to share target IP and target ports. Target IP is a unique address that specifies the intended recipient in the network and the target port is the end point for any network communication, also unique.
Since the geolocation of the machine is demanding with dynamic IPS, target IP and target ports will help Sleuths significantly narrow their search and help them trace the devices used to create these counterfeit applications, and this is expected that the probe will further identify the culprits for the scandal. However, ECI has not yet share this data.
“It is a very sophisticated operation where the culprits are hidden behind three layers of confusion. Owners of mobile numbers used to create login IDs and passwords on one of the three ECI applications. Thousands of forged forms of 7 applications that are only official numbers.
Questions about OTP verification
Modus operandi analysis raises questions about security and verification in three ECI applications. In Its Letters to the Karnataka CEO, The CID South and “Presentation of the Step-by-Step Usage of the NVSP, VHA and Garuda Apps from the Voter/Public Perspective” and sessions Sama Extended to UPLOAD The Applications?
The Hindus sent E -mail to the CEO on August 29 and asked whether the data was provided and how anyone could request to delete the vote and abuse the authorization of other voters through ECI applications. Despite the reminder of the e -mail 4. September there was no answer.
Mr. Patil, who eventually won the elections to the assembly of 2023 by 10,348 votes, said: “If we did not make a big problem about these applications, the votes could be removed.” Mr. Patil claimed that most of the affected voters were Congress voters. “After I have marked this problem, the election machines reacted seriously and helped us intervention and saved these voices. However, it is a matter of concern that the spacecraft has hit ECI roadblocks that do not share technical data with investigators.
