A look into the playbook of the BJP in Kerala

ANDafter the election, senior Communist Party of India (Marxist) leader Thomas Isaac noted, “Although the BJP (Bharatiya Janata Party) won three seats in the Kerala assembly, the NDA’s vote share is only 14.2%, down from the 19.24% vote share in the 2024 assembly elections and the 16% (local government vote share) it held a few months ago.”

This assessment pervades much of the BJP’s secular opposition. But he misunderstands Hindu nationalism in Kerala, which has spread despite abysmal electoral results. This dichotomy between cultural inroads by the Sangh Parivar and its electoral performance needs analysis.

Even with the elections in mind, the shifting winds cannot be ignored. While the BJP’s vote share remained almost the same at under 11.5%, it has converted three of the nine runner-up positions from 2021 into wins this time, while coming second in the other six seats. Apart from that, there are 15 seats in the third position in which she got 30,000-40,000 votes. This is also when 50% of the seats in the state got less than 15,000 votes in that election. This shows the beginning of a tendency to break the established bipolarity in the state. As stated by Kerala state BJP president Rajeev Chandrashekhar, for many years “the BJP has been excluded from Kerala politics and that lock has been broken”. More important is the symbolism evoked at the national level by the unstoppable BJP when in Kerala the party achieved three seats in the lower house assembly for the first time in 2026; corporate victory for the first time in Thiruvananthapuram in 2025; and a seat in parliament in 2024.

A changing cultural landscape

Despite these subtle electoral shifts, Hindutva is already changing the cultural and political language of Kerala. Kerala, with its unique presence of Christians, Muslims and Communists, is truly the last frontier of Hinduism. As scholars have argued, Hindutva cannot enter new regions without vernacularizing itself, bringing it into local cultural mores, and even by going beyond the Sangh Parivar.

In a dominant middle-class state with high human development, violence and vigilantism cannot become the main means of Hindu nationalist expansion. Instead, culture becomes the central theme; besides, there is an attempt to project an image of development and modernity through personalities like Mr. Chandrashekhar, ‘Man Metro’ E. Sreedharan and retired civil servants who have joined the BJP.

In the demographics of Kerala, where the Hindu population is less than 55%, vernacular literature also takes the form of wooing the powerful Christian community by promising them ‘micro-minority’ status with associated social benefits and electoral mandates.

The BJP’s electoral breakthroughs are products of Hindutva’s long-term non-electoral and “non-political” interventions through activities such as welfare organization, temple renovation, family reunions, etc. As scholars Dayal Paleri and R. Santhosh have shown through their fieldwork, these activities have pushed Hindutva ideas forward even in a city with a historical presence of Christians in Hinduism and Hinduism. Jewish tradition.

Nevertheless, the popular nationalization of Hindu nationalism is not unproblematic, as a process of nationalization was also taking place at the same time. For example, there are attempts to introduce icons like Chhatrapati Shivaji to Kerala, or to promote festivals like Mahamagham, which have historically never been considered strictly religious events, like “Kerala’s Kumbh Mela”, creating tension with local traditions.

But the language of development also slips when basic Hindu concerns erupt, such as when a BJP candidate from Guruvayur constituency allegedly made a speech suggesting the absence of a Hindu MLA in the constituency for 50 years, attracting a police case. Events outside the state, such as anti-Christian violence in Manipur, arrests of Kerala nuns in Chhattisgarh, and proposed restrictions under the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act (which raised concerns about government control of Christian institutions) also show how national Hindutva is clashing with the vernacular.

Religion to the fore

There is no doubt that Hindutva can reap substantial electoral gains only if it is able to secure Hindu votes. Post-2021 and 2016 polls (Lokniti-CSDS) showed the BJP still dominant in the Savarna, with more support from “upper caste” Nairs (27%-33%) than OBC Ezhavas (23%-18%) and Dalits (7%-23%). And although parts of the church wanted to enter into a transactional relationship with Hindutva, Christian support remained abysmal (2%-10%).

However, a mere election-centric analysis obscures Hindu nationalism, which brings the discourse of religion to the fore in the public sphere, replacing issues of caste, class and gender equality. The Sabarimala temple issue, in which the Left retreated from its original stance on women’s entry and resorted to occasional Islamophobic tropes, are clear examples. It also dented Kerala’s unique interfaith hospitality. The battle to confront the dominant political power is fought not only through elections, but, as the Marxist philosopher Antonio Gramsci recognized, also through culture: universities, religious institutions, the media and labor unions. Therefore, the secular opposition would be remiss if they allowed themselves to be lulled into drowsiness based only on the BJP’s electoral performance in Kerala.

Nissim Mannathukkaren is at Dalhousie University in Canada and is the editor of “Hindu Nationalism in South India”

Published – 18 May 2026 0:35 AM IST