The interim probes report to the Air India crash is likely to raise more questions than it answers. Aviation safety AMIT Singh, who flew Boeing 777 and is the founder of NGO security matters, says that the report lacks technical transparency and omitting recommendations on the necessary inspections and immediate remedial steps.
What are the key peaks of the probe message?
The report begins with emphasizing the FAA Special FAA FAA Special Air -wouthitys in terms of potential release of the fuel switching element. Air India has not seen this fleet. The mechanical failure of the fuel switch mechanism could allow the switches to move directly and bypass the safety function. This probably resulted in a reduction in the intake of fuel into two engines and their subsequent shutdown, resulting in an accident.
The second important aspect of the report is to find out at what stage the engines have ceased to produce the move, which eventually led to an accident. The report states that the aircraft was in the air in the air at 138.39 hours and reached a maximum speed of 180 knots in 1.38.42 pm, after which two fuel control switches moved to the “cut -off” position. One would imagine that it was a point where the engines would stop producing a thrust, but the message further states that the RAM air turbine (rat), which is a backup power source that is activated after two engine failure, was deployed during the initial climb, immediately after takeoff. In order to put on the rat, both engines must stop. Therefore, we can deduce that the engines stopped just before lifting. However, fuel control switches have been moved to turn off much later.
What do we need to know to understand whether it was human activity or unintentional?
Specifically, we will have to know what the exact actions of the cockpit and protocols were switching. We also need a complete transcription of the cockpit voice recording, while the preliminary message provides only a sentence that has been replaced between two pilots, where one asks the other, why he turned off the fuel that the other pilot says he did not do so.
Information is also required whether locking mechanisms on switching fuel were installed or deactivated. Also, if there were any unusual system inputs or failure.
Compared to other high -profile preliminary reports, such as the 33 -page Ethiopian airline ET 302 (737 MAX) report, the AI 171 report is particularly short and is missing in technical transparency. The ET 302 report included extensive data tracks, CVR excerpts, control lists and manufacturer’s bulletins, allowing stakeholders to act quickly around the world. On the other hand, the AI 171 report sounds more like a narration than a technical investigation and does not offer clarity and urgency guaranteed by such a catastrophic event.
What are the chances of two switches that move or cross themselves?
Such a possibility is extremely unlikely unless there is one of the following.
Function of the fuel switching was released, as shown in the FAA SAIB in 2018, or a defective installation of the lock on the fuel switch, which allowed the unintended movement and interrupted the fuel supply to the engine.
Other options include vibrations that experience quadrant or levers due to the uneven surface of the track. Or if there were some uneven system inputs or failure, that is, there was no input from the pilots.
What do you do about Boeing’s advice and Air India’s inability to take corrective measures?
This reflects a serious delay in safety supervision. SAIB NM-18-33 warned exactly this failure regime, but there is no evidence that Air India acted. The corrective measure could have prevented this accident.
Also, the interim report AAIB was to issue clear and immediate recommendations, including the inspection and verification of the switching of fuel switching across all Boeing 787 aircraft, (a) policy changes to increase SAIB to comply with the regulations.
