Two weeks have passed since the fatal Flight Air India Flight AI 171 in Ahmedabad 12 June. A vital digital flight data recorder (DFDR) and voice recorder (CVR) were obtained. Initial reports reported that they were damaged and sent to the US to the National Transport Safety Council (NTSB) to the decod. Subsequently, the authorities announced that it is decoded in India.
Since there are rumors and theories, they blame the Boeing 787-8 Dreamliner and various YouTube experts who exclude different interpretations, there is fear not only between passengers, but also with the Air India. Continued delay in coming with information that could rest the wild rumors and the silence of the Civil Aviation Directorate (DGCA), as well as airline, forces me to reassure the public that flying is safe, and it is a system that is caused by.
The only visual guide we have is the CCTV shots issued by the airport operator. Although it does not show the first part of the take -off run, it provides a fundamental guide about the second part and why is a “human error” and not a plane, fault. If the entire take -off sequence was available in the video, the reputation would be caused that the flight did not use the entire length of the track, but took off from the intersection. The Flight Tracker provider explained that it was used along the entire length, but there was a new doubt: if the aircraft used a rotary pad before the end of the track to speed up the departure. We hope that DFDR findings will be released immediately in the interest of Air India and Boeing.
These are shots, it is obvious that the aircraft emerged from the four -second brand. In this frame, you can see the aircraft on the traveling track B to turn into a parallel taxi. The B-Crossroads are approximately 600 feet from the 23-end runway. All main wheels and nasal bike AI 171 are on the track because it passes through penetration B in the seventh second video. This is a clear indication that the aircraft did not reach the minimum speed for lifting. The eight -second brand is AI 171 almost at the end of the track and did not turn due to takeoff. The take -off rotation is almost five seconds and at a speed of 174 knots (as shown in some radar graphs), the aircraft would cover almost 1,500 feet in this period. This would take it well to the area of exceeding that is not paved and which will have compacted sand and gravel.
The first sign of rotation appears on the 15 -second mark and one can see a cloud of rising dust. A few seconds later, you can see how the aircraft (swing) appears on the right side, indicating the right engine failure. The exhaust from the left engine can be seen for another three seconds, blowing dust and the remains away. The left engine also stops and the attitude to the high nose of the aircraft clearly indicates the imminent stand. Ingestion of engine residues and possible ingestion of birds during the flight part in the area of crossing could result in failure of both engines due to damage to foreign objects. Birds, although not visible in low -resolution shots, must be there because the track and travel track at Ahmedabad airports are surrounded by fresh growth of grass and weeds. This is visible in the video.
Many questions
Questions arise: 1) Was the poor weight and the temperature entered in the computer for flight management? 2) Didn’t pilots use the entire length of the track with respect to high temperature? 3) Why did the pilots do not recognize slower than normal acceleration? Didn’t they observe the vector of the speed trend on the tape on the primary flight tape? The trend vector would indicate the estimated speed in 10 seconds and at 100 nodes should show more than V2 speed. If they acknowledged it, why didn’t they refuse to take off when there are 3,000 feet of track? The aircraft could safely stop at the end of the track. 4) Although they were approaching B and recognized insufficient speed, they had 600 feet of the track at the end of the track, 60 meters reinforced zones and another 240 meters of fixed land as the safety area at the end of the track (RESA). This 1,600 feet plus a bright space beyond the border wall would be sufficient to stop with maximum brakes and maximum reverse. The aircraft could have been damaged, but it was possible to achieve a safe stop.
Lack of situational consciousness and knowledge of performance is an area of concern. Training seems to be insufficient in terms of track marking. Air India has a history that it does not recognize the brands and landing areas.
1) January 20, 1999: VT-EVA Air India B-747-400 in Frankfurt. Probable cause: “Ground contact about 1,000 meters before the landing zone (short) was the result of an unstabilized final approach that was not interrupted by the start of the early procedure in time. The continuation of the manual approach, although the flight crew was not qualified for Cat II/III approaches;
2) May 22, 2010: Air India Express 812: High and Quick Access and Late Touch led to exceeding and fatal accident
3) 14 January 2014: Air India B 787-800, registration of VT-ANM, performing flights AI-301 from Sydney, NS to Melbourne, VI (Australia), descended towards the International Airport in Melbourne. The aircraft was Essendon Airport Airport 35 (1,500 meters/length 4,930 feet) and descended towards this track when it hit the air traffic administrator and subsequently told the crew that their runway was in their two or positions that were still cleaned for visual access 34.
4) September 7, 2018: Air India 263 operating on the Delhi-Thirvananthapuram-Male sector, affected the construction of a man.
5) August 7, 2020: Air India Express 1344 exceeds the runway, resulting in 21 deaths. This approach was high and fast and there was a very late landing.
6) December 5, 2024: Air India (AI2592) from Moop Airport to Hyderabad was involved in a serious incident, when the pilots tried to take off from the travel track instead of the designated track. The ATC ordered the pilots to refuse.
All these point to serious shortcomings in the field of training and safety. Fatigue and stress that contributes to human mistakes is another area that the airline must deal with. So many lives have been lost and there is a fear of lack of understanding of human failure. There is no responsibility and Tatas will have to take a very bold attitude to the repair of the drift. The captain who returns from take -off or on -board conductor reports to the patient for fear is not healthy trends to display the safe culture of the airline. Tatas and Boeing must come out with some positive information as soon as possible to make pilots, crew and public. Farming will cost them a huge price.
Captain A. Ranganathan is a former aviation instructor and advisor for aviation safety. He is also a former member of the Civil Aviation Safety Council (CASAC), India.
Published – 27th June 2025 05:12
