In December 2025, Telangana’s ruling Congress swept the local polls, winning 53.7% of the gram panchayats. This analysis maps each of these 12,702 results individually to their constituencies, mandals and reservation categories, covering 94 rural/semi-urban ACs and 590 mandals. The partisan leanings of each sarpanch were collected through district-level reporters on the ground; reservation category of each seat was obtained from Telangana State Election Commission. Together, these two data streams make it possible to read results not only by party aggregate, but also by geography, community category and the specific political context of each constituency. The BRS held 27.7% of the panchayats, the BJP managed 5.5% and the rest went to smaller parties, independents and rebels. Mapped by constituencies, Congress was leading in 83 out of 94 rural/semi-urban ACs, BRS in 8, BJP in 2 and others in 1. At the mandal level, Congress was leading in 445 out of 590. The sweep extended far beyond the 62 out of 94 rural/semi-urban seats023 that the Congress won in 22.
The MLA variable
The single most revealing pattern in the data is the effect of MLA defection. Eight BRS legislators crossed over to Congress in capacity, if not in law, campaigning under the banner of Congress, coordinating with its leadership, and deploying workers. The Speaker of the Assembly did not disqualify them under the anti-crossing law, keeping them formally members of the BRS even though they were acting as Congress on the ground. It is this legal gray area that allowed the twists: the same MLA could go to the Congress for the panchayat elections, return to the BRS for the municipalities and never technically leave the party. The consequences are clearly written in the data. In the eight constituencies where MLAs were crossed, the BRS averaged just 18.6% against the Congress’ 61.8%. Where BRS MLAs remained, the party averaged 38.4%, almost matching the Congress’ 37.7%. One exceedance of the MLA cost the BRS roughly 20 percentage points. Banswada is the worst case: BRS was left with 2.2% share of panchayats. The party structure did not break; walked out the door with the MLA.
Patancheru proved that the effect works both ways. Her BRS MLA switched to Congress in July 2024; Congress won the segment in December 2025. When the same MLA returned to BRS in January 2026 before the municipal polls that followed, BRS swept the city wards in February 2026. Same constituency, same leader, opposite results in two different elections, MLA was the only variable that changed. Where the MLAs were firm, the BRS showed that it remained a formidable local force. Harish Rao’s Siddipet returned 80% of the panchayats to the BRS, reducing the Congress to 6.6%. Sircilla KTR gave BRS 47% Panchayats. Jangaon, Narsapur and Dubbak posted competitive BRS numbers. The party came second in 67 out of 94 ACs despite having no government at any level and eight of its own legislators contesting against it.
Absence of BJP in rural areas
The BJP finished fourth or worse in 79 out of 94 rural/semi-urban constituencies, won zero panchayats in 20 ACs and more than half of the state’s mandals, and its significant presence is limited to two northern seats in Adilabad, Mudhole (49.7% panchayats) and Adilabad (35.3% panchayats). Kamareddy’s paradox captures the gap between assembly performance and organizational reality: a BJP sitting MLA finished third in his own constituency with 9.4% of panchayats. In South Telangana, BJP is not weakening. it doesn’t exist. Rural Telangana remains a bipolar Congress-BRS contest.
North-South divide
The regional division further sharpens the picture. North Telangana, i.e. the old districts of Adilabad, Nizamabad, Karimnagar and Medak, has 5,418 panchayats. Congress got 47.5%, BRS 27.4% and BJP 9.3% here. South Telangana i.e. old districts of Warangal, Khammam, Nalgonda, Ranga Reddy and Mahbubnagar account for 7,284 panchayats where Congress rose to 58.3%, BRS remained stable at 27.9% and BJP slipped to 2.7%. The pattern is clear: The BRS vote share is remarkably consistent in both regions, suggesting a baseline of organizational loyalty that does not depend on geographic location. The Congress is stronger in the south, where its parliamentary dominance was most complete in 2023. And the BJP’s already weak statewide presence is almost exclusively a northern phenomenon, fueled by sitting MLAs in Adilabad and pockets of Nizamabad and Karimnagar. South of this corridor, the party has no measurable rural footprint. This geographic context is important for reading the caste patterns that follow: tribal seats are concentrated in the north, Dalit seats are more evenly distributed, and the two geographies create different competitive dynamics.
Caste and reservation patterns
Looking at each party’s performance in reservation categories against the national average reveals a striking mirror image of the Congress and the BRS. The Congress is outperforming in tribal seats (ST Women +5.8%, ST General +3.6%), likely reflecting its post-2023 forest rights and tribal welfare policies. BRS is outperforming in Dalit seats (SC General +3.8%, SC Women +3.3%), retaining the loyalty built during its decades in power. The BJP shows its only notable variance in the BC Women seats (+3.8%) to 9.4% against its overall 5.5%. The SC base is the BRS’s most durable asset and the Congress’s most visible vulnerability.
What the villages said
The 2023 Congress wave has deepened rather than receded, strengthened by incumbency and absorbed by MLA networks. Whether this is real organizational growth or a temporary advantage for the ruling party will be seen only when the Congress ceases to be in government. The BRS survives as a collection of political strongholds, powerful where its leaders held, hollowed where they left. The BJP’s claim about Telangana’s growth story is contradicted at every level by this data. And the Left parties and independents, the CPI in Kothagudem, the CPM in Khammam, the rebels in Chennur, prove that where a movement has real local roots, no wave washes everything away. Telangana’s sarpanches were elected without party symbols. Almost every village knew exactly which party its candidate belonged to. And each village voted accordingly.
Pradeep Kumar Dontha is a political consultant based in Hyderabad. Vignesh Karthik KR is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow in Indian and Indonesian Politics at KITLV-Leiden and a Research Fellow at the King’s India Institute, King’s College London.
Published – 25 March 2026 08:00 IST
